Abstract. In the process of e-literature procurement, there is asymmetric information between the library and the e-literature provider. This paper establishes a two-stage reputation model and analyzes the process of repeated games of the designated procurement of E-literature. We find that, although the behavior of the e-literature providers is difficult to be observed, and their efforts level will be lower than the level in the scenario of full information. With the consideration of future earnings, the effort level of the e-literature provider is strictly positive before the last period. Therefore, signing a long-term contract with the e-literature provider is beneficial to the library.
Introduction of Reputation Model
Fama (1980) [1] is the earliest economist who research the reputation model. He thinks that, in a competitive manager market, the market value of a manager is decided by his past performance. In the long run, a manager must take full responsibility for his behaviors. Even though there is not visible incentive contract, a manager also needs to work positively. Because it will improve his reputation in the manager market, consequently his future income may rise. If libraries only sign an once a time contract with E-literature providers, that is, once a time simple game, and libraries can observe the providers' behavior and use it as evidence to reward or punish the providers. Then the visible incentive contract can be implemented and stimulate the E-literature providers to choose the most advantageous action on the readers. In practice, it is difficult to know the providers' behavior and the level of effort. So the long run principal-agent relationship has great advantage. In practice, Sentinel procurement is often adopted in purchasing E-journals and E-books. The contract with fixed annual fee is signed. Libraries pay it in the end or the beginning of a year. The current payment is correlated with the service quality of prior period, that is, libraries will decide the current fee according to the service quality of last period provided by E-literature providers. So, in the form of sentinel procurement, we can treat the relationship of a library and an E-literature provider as a principal-agent relationship of a multiphase repeating game. According to the game theory, if an E-literature provider only pay attention to his short-term profit and don't care about his reputation, he may maximize his short-term profit. But in the long run, if the game will repeat lots of time, the provider may sacrifice his immediate interests so as to get long-term interest, and improve his future profit. So, if an effective reputation mechanism of E-literature providers can be built up, the inconsistency between E-literature providers' profit function and libraries' benefit function can be worked out [2] .
Assumptions of the Reputation Model Assumption 1. The game between a library and an E-literature provider only have two periods, t=1,2. In every period, the value created by the provider for the library (This value can be described as the visited volume of E-literature by readers) is [3] :
(1) where, is the value created by the provider for the library.
is the effort level of the E-literature provider. q is the operation capacity of the E-literature provider( it is independent of time). is an exogenous random variable(it represents the uncertainty of literature policy, readers' preference and the change of published literature number). We also assume that, is the private information of the E-literature provider, and is common information. q and are subject to independent normal distribution, their means all are 0, 0
; their variance are respectively and . Furthermore, assume the random variables and are independent with each other, that is, . Assumption 2. The E-literature provider is risk neutral. His discount rate is 1. Then his utility function is [4] :
where, is the earnings of the E-literature provider in period t. ) ( t c α is his cost of effort( that is the negative utility of working). ) ( t c α has the following nature:
, that is, the cost of effort increases the increasing of effort level. And it is obvious that 0
The E-literature market is fully competitive. The library has the capacity of rational expectation. The relationship between the library and the E-literature provider can only maintain two periods. The period t=2 is the final period. In this period, the provider need not care about his reputation. So, in period t=2, the optimal effort level of the provider 0 2 = α . On the other hand, the earnings of the provider in period 2 depend on the library's expectation about the operation capacity of the provider (θ ). Moreover, the effort level of the provider, 1 α , will influence this expectation via 1 π ( the value produced by the provider in period 1). So, in period 1, the effort level of the provider is greater than 0, that is ,
The Analysis of the Reputation Model
With the above assumption, the actual return of the E-literature provider is equal to the expectation income, that is:
where, is the library's expectation about the effort level of the provider in period 1. ) (
is the library's expectation about the value produced by the provider for readers in period 2, given that the actual value produced by the provider in the period 1(this value can be described as the visited volume of E-literature by readers). Owing to 0 ) ( ) (
From assumption 3, it can be that is the actual effort level of the provider when the E-literature market is in equilibrium. However, when the library observes that the value produced by the provider is 1 π , the library will know that σ is, the greater τ is. According to the formula of rational expectation and assumption 1, 0 = θ E . There is:
The above formula indicates that, given 
Conclusions and Suggestion
From above analyzing of reputation model, the following enlightments can be found: the reputation mechanism has self-motivation, constraint and supervision roles on the E-literature provider. The reputation of the provider in prior period will strongly impact her utility of following periods. Once her reputation is lost, it need very high cost to rebuild it. So, it is important to use reputation mechanism in the practice of library E-literature procurement. Owing to it is still unsophisticated to wield the reputation mechanism in lots industries, the following issues should be considered:
Information Disclosure System of E-literature Providers Should Be Established
In every period of the contract signed with the provider, the library need to count and disclose the value produced by the provider, and disclose the information of post-sale service performance (such as, whether the provider keeps promises, and renew E-literatures timely), the period of supplying E-literature and so on, so as to encourage the provider to act in the most favourable fashion to readers. If the provider has dishonest recorders, the library should terminate the contract with her, so as to compel the provider cherish her reputation. In the meantime, the dynamic communication channel should be built, let the library and the provider keep communication for information regularly or irregularly [5] .
Building the Reputation Evaluation System of the E-literature Provider
After signing a contract with a provider, a library should objectively evaluate the provider in every period. Through the process of revaluating, it can stimulate the provider to work hard constantly and to enhance her own value. When the value produced by the provider becomes lower, the library would give the provider lower evaluation. The reputation of the provider would decline, and then she would face the situation of substituted by another provider. So, only when the library rewards or punishes the provider according to the accurate information of her reputation, the incentive and constraint role of the reputation mechanism would work.
